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With regard to the contemporary discussion of recognition and disrespect in social philosophy, this 
chapter argues that Hegel is not only a seminal 'theorist of recognition,' but also a sophisticated 
'theorist of disrespect.' By means of the relationship of lord and bondsman as developed in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit it is shown that for Hegel the emergence of recognition not only involves 
freedom and autonomy but can also result in dependency and asymmetry. Building on this assump­
tion, the paper pursues a threefold aim: first, to show, through a reconstruction of Hegel's thoughts 
on the development of self-consciousness, that a successful form of subjectivation is only possible 
when a subject can actualize itself in so called 'egalitarian' and 'differential' acts of recognition. 
The second part aims at a re-reading of Hegel's thinking of the lord/bondsman-relationship. In op­
position to the classic 'heroic reading' of this relationship, I make the case for a 'subaltern reading,' 
arguing that Hegel presents in the figure of the bondsman a form of asymmetric recognition, in 
which the subject is bound to those conditions that hold it in disrespect. Finally, the third part aims 
at a reinterpretation of Hegel's thought from the perspective of disresprect in order to show that the 
other side of Hegel's theory of recognition forms a theory of symbolic vulnerability. Starting from 
this theory one can understand the paradoxical dynamic of disrespect that leads subjects to identifY 
with the relations that subjugate them. 
One of the most famous relationships of subordination in the history of philos­
ophy is certainly the relationship of lord and bondsman as developed by Hegel 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. First and foremost due to Alexandre Kojeve's 
influential commentary from the 1930s, this relation was regarded for a long 
time as the core of Hegel's theory of recognition. Mediated by Kojeve's inter­
pretation, the figures of lord and bondsman became a characteristic motif of 
twentieth century French social philosophy. Whether in the writings of Jean­
Paul Sartre, as the relation of the gaze; in Jacques Lacan, as the imaginary 
transference relation; or in Frantz Fanon, as the relation between colonisers 
and the colonised- wherever intersubjective tensions were the object of theo­
retical reflection, the model of lord and bondsman was regarded as a key to 
deciphering the real nature of such conflicts: a struggle for recognition, in 
which it is not so much the physical but rather the social life of the participants 
that is at stake. 1 
More recently, an influential strand of the reception of Hegel has proposed 
that the Phenomenology, and with it, the lord/bondsman-relationship, already 
represents a first stage of decline in Hegel's theory of recognition. In particu-
1 For a broad survey of the French reception of Hegel, see Roth 1988. The special influence of 
Kojeve's Hegel interpretation on French philosophy is treated in Descombes 1980; as well as by 
Butler 1987. 
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Jar, the younger representatives of critical theory, Ji.irgen Habermas and Axel 
Honneth, have argued that in the Phenomenology, the crucial point of Hegel's 
theory of recognition has already been abandoned. Honneth names three rea­
sons for this: first, a strong intersubjective concept of human identity is sub­
ordinated here to a developmental logic of consciousness; second, the histori­
cally productive role of the struggle for recognition is not taken into account 
sufficiently; and third, there is no productive differentiation between different 
levels of recognition (cf. Honneth 1995, 62f.).2 
In contrast to this recent approach to Hegel, I would like to argue in this 
essay for a 'Return to the Phenomenology!' by taking up the strand of the 
French reading of Hegel that sees a special social theoretical potential in exact­
ly this work. In my opinion, two reasons speak for such a return. First, Hegel 
shows us here more clearly than anywhere else the extent to which the devel­
opment of subjectivity is intimately connected with the achievement of rec­
ognition. I would thus like to argue that the Phenomenology represents not a 
theoretical flattening, but rather a theoretical deepening of Hegel's thought 
insofar as it makes explicit that the subject's dependency on recognition is an 
existential matter. Further, I see a return to the Phenomenology justified by the 
fact that Hegel here for the first time lets the struggle for recognition lead to 
the relation of lordship and bondage. This allows him to connect the develop­
ment of recognition not merely to the development of freedom and equality, 
but rather to show that the dependency of recognition must also be under­
stood as the condition of inequality and asymmetry. Insofar as Hegel explores 
the precarious nature of intersubjective relations of dependency through the 
lord/bondsman-relationship, he proves himself not only to be a subtle 'theorist 
of recognition' but also just as much a sophisticated 'theorist of disrespect. '3 
Starting from this diagnosis, my essay pursues a threefold aim. First, through 
a reconstruction of Hegel's thinking of the development of self-consciousness, I 
would like to show that recognition by the other is of existential significance 
for a subject. With this it will become clear that a successful form of self-actua­
lization is only possible if a subject knows itself as recognized both as an 
equal and as an individual. Only in the framework of so called 'egalitarian' and 
'differential' acts of recognition, so I will argue, is a subject brought to life (I). 
The second part of my considerations aims to re-read Hegel's thinking of the 
2 Similar arguments were previously made by JOrgen Habermas, who speaks of how the "communi­
cative reason" that emerges in Hegel's early writings is already subordinated in the Phenomenology 
to the framework of his philosophy of the subject (Habermas 1990, 31 and 41 ). For the impact of 
this position in the French language literature, see Ricreur 2005, 173 and 186. Representative of the 
English language literature is Williams 1997, 27. 
3 A re-reading in this vein has been recently undertaken by Patchen Markell: "Hegel's account sug­
gests that the pursuit of recognition itself may be implicated in the formation and maintenance of un­
just relations of social power" (Markell 2003, 112). In reference to the 'unhappy consciousness' 
that develops out of the lord/bondsman-relationship, Judith Butler has also attempted to show with 
an alternative reading how Hegel connects recognition and disrespect in his thought (Outler 1997). 
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lord!bo�dsman-relationship. In opposition to the classic 'heroic reading,' I 
would like to put forward a 'subaltern reading' that makes explicit the manner 
in which Hegel's use of the figure of the bondsman reveals a form of asym­
metrical recognition, in which the subject is bound to the conditions that at 
the �arne _
time hold it in disrespect (II). Following this, the third part of my 
readmg atms at a reinterpretation of Hegel's theory of subjectivity from the 
perspective of disrespect. Here I would like to make it clear that the other side 
of �egel's theo� of recognition forms a theory of symbolic vulnerability. 
Startmg from th1s theory, we can understand the paradoxical dynamic of dis­
respect that forces the bondsman to identity with the relations that hold him in 
subjugation (III). 
I. From Theoretical to Ethical Self-Consciousness 
My reconstruction of the development of self-consciousness starts from the 
idea that Hegel's often convoluted and obscure argumentation can be relatively 
clearly structured into four steps. In a first step, Hegel lays out the problem 
that he sees contemporary theories of self-consciousness confronted with. In 
three further steps, which go from practical, through social to ethical self-con­
sciousness, he develops an alternative conception of the intersubjective char­
acter of self-consciousness. With few, but nevertheless strong brush strokes 1 
would like to give a sketch of each of these steps. ' 
Before we begin, we need to get grip on what the expression self-con­
sciousness means for Hegel. Hegel does not give an explicit definition any­
where, but it is clear that, following the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, he defmes 
a reflexive recourse of consciousness upon itself as "self-consciousness"- so 
firstly by this expression a kind of self-relation is designated. For Hegel, this 
self-relation is not an indifferent relation, but is, rather, based on a certain kind 
of self-interest, and is founded upon the question, "who am I?". And insofar as 
self-consciousness attempts to answer this question, it develops a specific 
conception of who it is and what constitutes its existence- we can thus speak 
of it as developing a specific self-conception. The idea of self-consciousness 
with which Hegel then operates, thus signifies a tripartite relation of self-rela� 
tion, self-interest, and self-conception.4 With this explication of the idea of 
elf-consciousness, we can now sketch the problem that Hegel sees self-con­
ciousness as initially confronted with. 
� Robert Brandom makes a very similar tripartite determination of the concept of self-conscious­
ncs.s and e.mphasizes that what constitues the essence of a self-conscious being is dependent upon wh1ch attnbutes are fundamental for 1t. For Brandom self-consciousness is characterized above all 
through it capacity for "self-transformation." He summed up this insight in the often quoted state­
lll'lll that "c scntially self-conscious beings do not have natures, they have histories" (Brandom 
007, t2R). 
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Hegel begins his discussion of self-consciousness with a critique of Descartes' 
and Kant's rationalist positions. According to Hegel, the key characteristic of 
such positions is that the tripartite structure of self-consciousness is interpreted 
as a theoretical relation. That is, in this tradition the answer to the question 
"who am I?" is found through a reflection in thought. Following Hegel, this 
position can be summarized by the term 'theoretical self-consciousness.' The 
deficiency of this form of self-consciousness consists in the fact that its con­
ception of self is a mere abstract and universal understanding; it has existence 
only in the thought of the subject and is purely ideal. As long as this remains 
the case, the subject cannot achieve any self-certainty. In other words, it suffers 
from a "lack of certainty."5 As long as the subject's self-conception exists only 
theoretically, self-consciousness cannot say with certainty who it is. 
For Hegel, the deficiency of theoretical self-consciousness can only be 
negated once self-consciousness gives itself the "form of being" (I 05).6 This 
means that the initially abstract and universal moment in theoretical self-con­
sciousness undergoes a process of objectification and in this process must 
prove itself to be true. For Hegel, the subject's conception of self can only be­
come certain through practical actions in the world. This practical action is the 
very point from which Hegel begins the story of the subject's experience, in 
order to show how the path of self-consciousness approaches step by step a con­
dition that he calls 'being in and for itself,' which simply means that the self­
conception of self-consciousness has been able to objectifY itself successfully 
in the world. To put it more simply: what for Hegel should be achieved in the 
practical intercourse with the world is self-certainty. But to reach this point, 
theoretical self-consciousness has a long way to go. It has to take three steps to 
achieve ''the truth of self-certainty," as the chapter on self-consciousness is titled. 
(i) Practical self-consciousness: The first stage in the subject's path of develop­
ment is practical self-consciousness. The logic of this stage is determined by 
the interplay of two elements: first, what the subject believes itself to be, and 
second, the practical activity through which it seeks to confirm this belief. 
The first element, self-conception, which the subject develops in response to its 
inherent question, "who am 1?," represents a kind of radicalized transcendental 
idealism. The subject initially believes to be the only independently existing 
being. That is, it starts from the assumption that it has an absolute freedom, 
on the basis of which it creates the world out of itseiC This self-conception 
5 In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences Hegel makes it clear that this lack has a positive 
counter-concept, when he speaks of self-consciousness as the "impulse lo realise its implicit na­
ture, by giving its abstract self-awareness content and objectivity" (Hegel 197 1 [ 1830], § 425). In  
his study on Hegel, Charles Taylor characterized th is  impulse with  the influential phrase "drive 
for integrity" (Taylor 1975, 150). 
6 All page numbers in parentheses refer to the Phenomenology of Spirit (llcgel 1977 (1807]). 
7 Here I am taking up the expression "abstract Freedom," which lie el uses in lh /:'11 y lopaedia to 
signify self-conception (Hegel1971 (1830), § 424). With this formuln h chno n tcoit•s o rudicoli7 ·d 
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can best be summarized in the statement, "I am everything, the world is noth­
ing."8 The second important element is the practical activity through which 
the subject attempts to actualize its self-conception. Hegel determines this as 
'desire,' which refers to the animal desire of recreation. It is through the con­
sumption of objects that practical self-consciousness can exhibit independency, 
insofar as it annihilates all living things around itself that could also claim to 
have this status. Through the satiation of desire, therefore, not only is the sub­
ject's hunger satisfied, but also its self-conception confirmed. And in the 
feeling of satiety this self-conception becomes objective for the first time. 
Hegel thus speaks of an "unalloyed feeling of self' ( 1 1 8) to make explicit that 
through the process of satisfYing needs, practical self-consciousness comes 
for the first time to a form of self-certainty .9 
For Hegel, the certainty achieved through desire does not last long; only 
as long as the feeling of satiety continues. Hence, already after a short time a 
new object must be consumed in order to reconstitute certainty. But insofar 
as this certainty can only be of a temporary duration, practical consciousness 
is caught in a restless process of self-assurance that can never come to an end. 
The transitory and inconstant nature of the feeling of satiety does not hold the 
subject captive to a circular process, but rather leads it to the insight that its 
self-conception was mistaken. Starting from the premise that it is the only in­
dependent being, in the restless consumption of things the subject must gain the 
insight that these things are also independent insofar as it can devour the indi­
vidual specimen, but not the species as such. Thus the subject comes to see 
that it must accept that there are other independent entities besides itself. Be­
cause this insight, however, undermines the self-conception of the subject in its 
fundaments, it must travel what Hegel calls the "way of despair" (49). Stripped 
of its self-conception, the subject has to pose the question, "who am I?," anew. 
(ii) Social self-consciousness: For Hegel, the moment the subject begins to 
develop a new self-conception, the transition to a second stage of development 
takes place. It is clear here that the new self-conception can no longer claim 
to possess absolute freedom, insofar as the subject has realized that it is just one 
independent being among others. Because the subject wishes to depart rrom its 
original self-conception as little as possible, it comes to an insight that can be 
paraphrased as follows: "lf l have to recognise other independent objects along­
side myself, then these objects have at least to comply to my rreedom." The 
li.untian idealism as expressed in Fichte's dictum, "All reality is an act of the self," or in Berkeley's 
't• • .  f' est percipi." On Hegel's relation to Fichte and Kant cf. Redding 2009, 95. 
N Frederick Neuhouser reformulates in a similar way self-consciousness's claim with the words, "I 
11111 everything (everything that counts), and my objects are nothing" (Neuhouser 2009, 44). 
' linn.- oe rg adamcr speaks of the immediate "vital certainty" that desire attains through the 
wn�uonrtion of objects (Gudamer 1976, 60). For further important points on desire and its fail­
Ill '· • N •uhou�cr 1986 and II nn •th OOR 
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subject thus no longer claims to be the only independent being, but it does claim 
to be the highest ranking of all independent beings. Therefore the self-con­
ception of possessing a superior freedom now takes the place of the claim to 
absolute freedom. Whilst for Hegel, the subject's self-conception in the first 
stage represented a radicalized version of Kant's transcendental idealism, the 
self-conception of this new stage represents a radicalized version of Hobbes' 
theol)' of natural law, insofar as the subject of natural law, who Hobbes has in 
mind, presumes that it has a "right to evel)' thing" (Hobbes 1996 [1651 ], 87).10 
With this phrase, Hobbes signifies exactly what I call from Hegel's perspective 
"superior freedom," namely, the claim to be able to have free reign over one's 
environment without external limitations on action. 
An important characteristic of the second stage of the subject's develop­
ment is that now other subjects come into play as well. To the extent that the 
subject realizes that other independent entities exist alongside it, it begins to 
differentiate between them and hence to distinguish between the object and 
the other.11 While in the first stage the subject orients itself for its self-assurance 
toward an undifferentiated outside, in the second stage it orients itself toward 
an other. This is because the subject has had to learn that the object only pro­
vides a temporal)' form of satisfaction. In contrast, the other seems to prom­
ise a more lasting form of satisfaction, because he is, as Hegel says, capable 
of self negation (Pinkard 1994, 52). This capacity of self-negation means at 
first nothing more than that the other human being is capable of its own sub­
jugation, through which he or she, as opposed to the object, can provide a con­
tinuous form of acknowledgement. What characterizes the acknowledgement 
received from other human beings is also the fact that while the subject can 
only be acknowledged in its objectivity by the object because the object has 
no 'notion,' so to speak, of subjectivity, the other can grasp the subject in its 
essence. Because only another human being is capable of understanding what 
the essence of a subject is, only he or she can affirm the subject as a subject. 
This special form of acknowledgement, which only the other can provide, is 
what Hegel calls recognition. After the failure of desire, the subject, whose 
stol)' of experience we are following, has thus finally won a new conception of 
the practical activity through which it can achieve self-certainty. 
It is the praxis of recognition and no longer the praxis of animal recreation 
that aids the subject in the second stage of its attempt to reach certainty of its 
self-conception. We can thus name this form of self-consciousness 'social self-
10 Hegel's recourse to Hobbes is discussed extensively in Siep 1974, Tamineaux 1985 and Peperzak 
1995 . 
11 Judith Butler points out that the other is not a new element in the subject's universe, but rather 
that an already existing phenomenon shows itself in a new perspective: "The appearance of the 
Other must be understood as emergence into explicit reality which has hitherto remained an im­
plicit or nascent being. Before its actual appearance, the Other remains opaque, but not for that rea­
son without reality. Coming into existence- or explicit appearance- is never, for Hegel, a creation 
ex nihilo, but is, rather, a moment in the development of a Concept" (Butler 1987, 47). 
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consciousness.' With this form of self-consciousness the subject comes to rea­
lize that it is dependent upon recognition by the other. Only if the other ac­
knowledges the subject's self-conception in actions and words it is brought 
into the world. The subject's existence is therefore essentially a social exis­
tence, insofar as it can only be certain of its existence through its recognition 
by others. In this context Hegel speaks of how in the encounter with the other 
elf-consciousness ends up 'out of itself,' which means that from now on it 
can only find itself in an exteriority: the subject comes to be only if it is out-
ide with the other. This decentring, however, is experienced as a threat be­
cause the subject is herein confronted with the loss of the power of its self­
determination. Self-consciousness's 'being out of itself should therefore not 
be read as a purely logical category, but must also be understood as the re­
flection of an emotional state as the German term 'aufter-sich-sein' implies: 
the subject's loss of its sovereignty makes it angl)' and aggressive.12 The other, 
n which the subject knows itself to be dependent, is at the same time the 
object of fear, anger, and aggression. This basic ambivalence forms the back­
ground for understanding the concrete encounter with another subject from 
the perspective of the experiencing subject. 
The practical demand for recognition leads the subject at first into a conflict 
with the other. As the other has the same self-conception, both subjects find 
themselves in a situation in which their respective self-conceptions are mu­
tually exclusive. And insofar as neither participant wishes to voluntarily give 
up its self-conception, a conflict which culminates in a life and death struggle 
develops out of this contradiction. Hegel's famous "struggle for recognition," 
I ads into the equally well-known relation of "lordship and bondage," which 
I will later go into in detail, in which the bondsman gives up his self-conception 
l the benefit of the lord. Through this, a first form of sociality emerges, in 
which the participants are capable of living together in a community.13 Ad­
mittedly, for Hegel this is only of temporal)' durability insofar as this com­
munity is based on "a recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (116) which 
I aves both participants unsatisfied. On the one hand we have the bondsman, 
who suffers under the inferior self-conception forced upon him, and on the 
llher hand the lord, who after a while comes to the realization that his su­
p rior self-conception is extremely unstable. This is because he actually de-
pi cs the bondsman on account of his inferior self-conception and thus cannot 
v llue the recognition he receives from him. The lord thus faces the problem 
th tl the recognition he receives comes from someone who he holds for not 
vurthy of recognition. Through this he finds himself in an "existential im-
11 lullith Outler has emphasized this point: 'That self-consciousness can find its own essential prin­
IJI  ·rnbodicd elsewhere appears as a frightening and even angering experience" (Butler 1987, 48). 
11 I11UI Redding speaks of a "primitive form of sociality" in which we already have Hegel's 
·ll lit' in its concept before us (cf. Reddin) 2009, I 06f.). A detailed reading of the lord/bond man-
1 ·l1tiun�hip is ulso ivcn in Ncuhou� r 200<> 
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passe" (Kojeve 1980, 46). We have now reached the point at which both sub­
jects we have met up to now have failed at their attempt to achieve certainty 
of their superior freedom. Thus both subjects have to question their identity 
once again. 
(iii) Ethical self-consciousness: To understand how the subject continues its 
process of experience after the failure of the lord/bondsman-relationship, one 
must venture a jump to the chapter on the ethical life in the Phenomenology. 
Here self-consciousness gains the insight that the freedom it seeks can only be 
a social freedom. This means that because of its experiences it cannot make a 
claim to freedom without acknowledging this claim on the part of others. Self­
consciousness is thus ready to restrict its unrestrained freedom, because it rea­
lizes that it can only achieve certainty when it is recognized by a free other, 
which presupposes that it also recognizes the freedom of the other. The claim 
to social freedom thus contains "less" than the claim to superior freedom, be­
cause here the subject's scope of possible agency is reduced for the benefit of 
others. In another sense, however, it actually contains "more," as the subject 
who claims social freedom- unlike in the case of superior freedom- can be 
reassured of this right in the face of others. Whilst this existed only in an ab­
stract idea that was confirmed by no one, the social freedom of the subject 
can be seen in the other insofar as he or she recognizes this freedom. Self-con­
sciousness thus realizes that actual freedom can only exist under conditions of 
mutual recognition. The subject's new self-conception on this level can be 
formulated thus: 'My freedom can only be the freedom of all.' The failure of 
the social conception of self has hence led to a form of self-relation that, with 
Hegel, we can call 'ethical self-consciousness.' 
After explaining the character of the subject's new self-conception, Hegel 
then shows us how the practices through which the subject gives this self­
conception a social existence are structured. Hegel differentiates between two 
forms of acts of recognition at work in the ethical community. On the one hand 
there is the "human law" of the community and on the other hand the "divine 
law" of the family (267 and 278).14 For Hegel, in the human law, those forms 
of recognition emerge that acknowledge the individual in his or her universa­
lity. When subjects follow the same law they oblige themselves not only to 
fulfil the same duties, but also recognize the same rights for all. It can be said 
that 'All are equal before the law' in the sense that every subject is granted the 
14 Of course, in this section Hegel discusses, using Sophocles' Antigone as an example, a first 
and insufficient form of the ethical life in which these two laws are still in conflict with each other. 
Even if for Hegel the ancient form of the ethical is doomed to failure, it still contains in its core 
already both of those principles that in the further course (of the experience of consciousness) are 
reconciled. Frederick Neuhouser has pointed out that this reconciliation represents the crucial 
point of Hegel's project: "The values of individuality and social membership are not to be thought 
of as competing or mutually exclusive ideals. In fact, each of these ideals, properly understood, can 
be realized only in conjunction with the other" (Neuhouser 2000, 15). 
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status of a legal person. The form of recognition expressed i n  human law can 
thus be called 'egalitarian recognition,' which, ignoring individual idiosyn­
crasies, acknowledges the subjects in those respects that are common to all. 
We can name this form of recognition respect. In divine law, which Hegel sees 
at work in the family, the situation is just the opposite. For Hegel, the family 
is the site in which the particularities of a subject find recognition. In contrast 
to the public sphere of the political community, which is so extensive that the 
members remain for the most part strangers, the private space of the family is 
still small enough to allow the members to know each other in their particular 
attributes and capacities. In contrast to human law, the kind of recognition 
granted by the law of the family concerns not the individual in his or her uni­
versality but rather the individual in his or her particularity. As every indivi­
dual is affirmed here in his or her singularity, the structure of recognition con­
sists no longer primarily in the emphasis of equality between the participants, 
but in exposing the differences between them. Hence it is not equality but 
rather difference that is distinctive for divine law, which is why in this case 
we can also speak of a 'differential recognition' or a valuation of the indivi­
dual for his or her individual particularities.15 
On the basis of these two scales of recognition practices, ethical self-con­
sciousness enters the sphere that Hegel calls "Spirit." This basically means that 
self-consciousness can find true certainty on this level. The subject can reach 
that condition of 'being in and for itself that Hegel proposed at the beginning 
as the goal of the process of self-development. We are now justified in saying, 
"Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact, it so exists 
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (I l l ). Recognition, 
as we have seen, must be understood here in a double sense of an egalitarian 
and a differential recognition. Only through this double action does the subject 
find itself again in the state that Hegel described with the famous expression 
of the "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I"' (110). In the ethical community, 
the deficiency with which the story of the development of the subject began 
has been superseded. The self-conception of self-consciousness is no longer 
abstract and universal; rather, it has objectified itself in the world, so that the 
ubject knows that it is conserved in the world in its particularity. In other 
words, self-consciousness has reached the condition of self-certainty. 
1' The two sides I have set out here have also been identified as the central components of the ethi­
cal I i fe by Robert Pippin when he emphasises that freedom can only be reached through the inter­
ploy of universal and individual recognition: 'That goal would be: to be able to show (i) that one 
could be a free subject only in being recognized as one; (ii) that what that would involve is being 
concretely recognized as, really taken as, one among many, and that (iii) the concrete or mediated 
noturc of uch recognition must mean in modern life being loved (or being able to be loved) as a 
J) ·•son, o dist inct, entitled individunll I" (Pippin 2008, 209). 
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Now that we have followed the process of the development of self-conscious­
ness through its various shapes, I would like to sum up three central points that 
Hegel has made explicit for us in this process: (i) The subject is driven by a lack 
of self-certainty, which can only be satisfied by recognition by others. It can 
only come to itself via the detour of alienation; it finds itself first and to begin 
with outside of itself. (ii) Hegel provides us at the same time with two norma­
tive criteria that he regards as necessary prerequisites for a successful self­
actualization of self-consciousness. It must know itself to be an equal among 
equals in its belonging to a community. And at the same time it must know it­
self in its particularity, through which it differs from other members of the 
community. Only through the double action of respect and valuation, egalita­
rian and differential recognition, can a subject actualize itself. (iii) Finally, 
Hegel tries to show us that a subject can only achieve the actualization of its 
self-conception in accord with others. Only in relations of mutual and symme­
trical recognition can the subject achieve that form of self-certainty, the find­
ing of which is for Hegel the original driving force of self-consciousness. 
While Hegel formulates in his first two theses basic insights into the nor­
mative character of intersubjective relations, I would like to show that his third 
thesis needs to be reformulated to meet the challenges of a critical social phi­
losophy. While Hegel wanted to show within a specific historical constellation 
that relations of recognition can only be actualized under conditions of mutual 
symmetrical equality and thus- at least in his youth- made the theory of rec­
ognition a critique of the existing state of affairs, today his theory remains an 
instrument of critique because it can help to show how relations of recognition 
contain a one-sided dependency through which asymmetric social relations are 
established and supported. In other words, recognition in its essence does not 
fundamentally tend toward mutual symmetry, but is rather radically asym­
metric. Instead of being a motor of emancipatory progress, recognition can in 
fact also cause relations of inequality. In what follows I would like to show 
that this insight can already be found in Hegel's text, if we undertake a reading 
of the struggle for recognition and the relation of lordship and bondage that 
differs from a conventional reading. 
II. Lordship and Bondage: Recognition and Asymmetry 
The project of an alternative reading of Hegel's theory of recognition takes up a 
French line of Hegel-interpretation that starts from Alexandre Kojeve's well­
known reading. Kojeve's lectures on the Phenomenolo!JY of Spirit, held be­
tween 1933 and 1939 at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, influ­
enced a whole generation of French intellectuals. 16 This is in part because he 
16 Kojeve's students included, among others, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Lev inn�. Maurice Merleau­
Ponty, and Georges Bataille. Although the oppo ite i onen n��c1t d. J •on Paul Snrtr did not 
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was able to communicate to his contemporaries a new fascination for the 
seemingly dry idiom of Hegel's philosophy. Above all, there were two themes 
that made up the special attraction of Kojeve's reading. On the one hand, his 
interpretation of Hegel's theory of self-consciousness takes as its starting point 
a 'desire for recognition,' which fundamentally distinguishes human existence 
from animal existence.17 In contrast to the latter, human desire is not directed 
toward an object, but toward another desire. The desire for recognition is thus 
essentially a desire to be desired by another. This point defines what has been 
called Kojeve's 'anthropological reading' of Hegel. On the other hand, 
Kojeve places the lord/bondsman-relationship at the centre of his interpretation. 
Between these two protagonists he sees not merely an internal logic of the 
development of self-consciousness at work, but a universal dialectic, which 
constitutes the model for the further course of human history as a whole.18 
This moment defines what is called Kojeve's 'historico-teleological reading' 
of Hegel. 
While many of Kojeve's well-known students appropriated the anthropo­
logical reading of Hegel and made the theme of recognition a central point of 
reference in their thought, at the same time for many others the theme of a 
continual historical process of progress became untenable, especially under 
the impact of National Socialism. As a consequence, the theme of lordship and 
bondage was separated from the historical teleological context and increasingly 
interpreted as a social ontological relation. Above all, the works of Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Jacques Lacan stimulated this transformation. For both thinkers, the 
lord/bondsman-relationship represents not so much the motor of history, but 
rather the foundation of every intersubjective encounter. In other words, for 
both Sartre and Lacan our social relationships are always already structured 
according to the asymmetric model of lordship and bondage. Sartre makes this 
explicit when in Being and Nothingness he states: "But this slavery is not a 
historical result [ . . .  ) of a life in the abstract form of consciousness. I am a slave 
to the degree that my being is dependent at the centre of a freedom which is not 
mine and which is the very condition of my being" (Sartre 200 2  [1943], 358). 
And Lacan concludes his well-known paper on the mirror stage with the 
comment that we are essentially bound to the other through an "imaginary 
ervitude" (Lacan 2002 [ 1949), 9). In the tradition of such a social ontological 
interpretation of the lord/bondsman-relationship, I would like to develop in 
what follows a reading that differs from the conventional interpretation of this 
1111end the lectures, but did know the scripts of Kojeve's lectures. For a l ist  of the seminar partici­
pant ee Roth 1988, 225. 
7 K �eve states in reference to this, "In other words, all  human, anthropogenetic Desire -the de­
�irc that generates Self-Consioucness, the human reality- is, finally, a function of the desire for 
'1 ·co nition'" (Kojcve 1980 [1947(, 7). 
11 In the relevant passage Kojcvc MfJtcs. "th • 'hi�torical' dialectic i the 'dialectic' of Master and 
S)(1v ·•· (Koj ve 1980, 9). 
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relationship insofar as it brings to the foreground the motif of a one-sided 
asymmetrical dependency of recognition.t9 Before I introduce this 'subaltern 
reading,' I would like to show why in my view the classic 'heroic reading' of 
this relationship seems to miss a crucial point of Hegel's argument. 
(i) The heroic reading: This reading starts from the premise that the lord/ 
bondsman-relationship is constituted by a fear of death, as a result of which 
one of the participants voluntarily subjugates himself to the other. Before the 
struggle comes to its fatal end, it is interrupted because one of the subjects fears 
risking its life. Thus instead of putting his life on the line, he prefers to sub­
jugate himself and become the bondsman of the other. The price he pays for 
saving his life is the renunciation of his self-conception of possessing a superior 
freedom. In this reading, the lord is the real hero of the story: as opposed to the 
fearful and weak-willed bondsman, he proves his steadfastness in the face of 
death. He is the one who for the sake of his self-conception risks his life and 
does not let himself be intimidated by his imminent death. It is this persever­
ance that in the history of philosophy has consistently elicited admiration for 
the lord. Following the motto, 'All or Nothing!', he would rather die a hero 
than lose what he is fighting for. 
Admittedly, the heroic reading does have in an attenuated form a quite 
plausible connection to everyday practical experience (Brandom 2007, 1 3 1 ). 
Insofar as in everyday life we often have particular respect for those who stand 
by their conception of self even in situations where they have to accept grave 
disadvantages for this- for example, when someone leaves a well-paid posi­
tion for moral reasons. In contrast, we have little regard for someone who at the 
first sign of difficulty throws his or her self-conception overboard- for instance 
when someone is ready to suspend important moral convictions for the sake 
of gratification. But even if the heroic reading in such cases seems to find a 
certain confirmation in real life situations, it leaves the conditions that consti­
tute the scope of possible action unconsidered, in order to concentrate exclu­
sively on the actors as strong-willed authors of their actions. Above all, how­
ever, I think it does not do justice to Hegel's project, because by focussing on 
the heroic lord it overemphasizes the potential for autonomous self-control 
and thus loses sight of the existential significance of recognition by others. 
There are three objections that I think can be brought against the heroic 
reading. Firstly, one needs to keep in mind that for Hegel, the lord, who ap­
pears here as the archetype of successful self-actualization, later becomes the 
figure who remains arrested in his development. This suggests that the actual 
19 Patchen Markell also offers an alternative reading of the lord/bondsman-relationship. In contrast 
however to my project, which centers on the figure of the bondsman, Markel l 's discussion starts 
from the figure of the lord, and attempts to show that the endeavor to gain recognition doe not 
have to be e sentially connected to the establishment of mutual equality, but rnther can lead to 
the produ tion f relnt.ion� of social power (cf. Markell 200 • 90 122) 
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developmental leap that is executed in the struggle should not be sought on the 
side of the lord, but on the side of the bondsman. Secondly, the heroic reading 
eems to me to abbreviate the struggle for recognition because it overlooks 
the fact that for Hegel in the Phenomenology this struggle is carried out until 
the point of death, while in earlier versions it is interrupted before this point. 
Here the life-and-death struggle remains for the participants not a mere dark 
presentiment; it becomes a bitter reality. And as a consequence, thirdly, what 
is further overlooked is that the subject, whose story of experience we follow, 
at first survives the struggle as a victor, before it decides to subjugate itself to 
the other as its bondsman. Only when one takes these three points into con­
sideration, does it become sufficiently clear why in the Phenomenology Hegel 
has the life-and-death struggle lead to the famous relation of lordship and bon­
dage. For indeed, instead of, as in earlier drafts, going directly over to the in­
sight that recognition is only possible between equals, in the Phenomenology, 
Hegel explores the possibility of recognition being the cause of inequality and 
one-sided dependency. 
(ii) The subaltern reading: This reading starts from the premise that self-con-
ciousness, the development of which we follow in the Phenomenology, is that 
which survives the life-and-death struggle by killing the other. This reading can 
claim to be a 'close reading' insofar as Hegel himself explicitly states that the 
experience of self-consciousness extends through the life-and-death struggle to 
the point at which it has "survived the struggle" ( 1 1 4).20 If one approaches the 
interpretation of the struggle from this perspective, the focus is displaced from 
the question of which of the participants has risked their life to the question 
of what the survival of the struggle means for the subject. And Hegel's an­
swer is unequivocal: victory in the struggle is for self-consciousness not so 
much a sign of its honour, as rather the cause for its failure. Similarly to the 
case of animal desire, the subject here must come to realize that to the extent 
that it destroys its counterpart, the certainty of its own self-conception, which 
actually is supposed to emerge from this, is called into question. The "trial by 
death," as Hegel observes, "does away with the truth which was supposed to 
issue from it, and so, too, with the certainty of self generally" ( 1 1 4). In the 
case of the life-and-death struggle, the reason for this failure lies simply in the 
fact that without the other, who it has killed, the subject is no longer capable 
of achieving acknowledgement of its self-conception. This is because through 
the killing of the other, the subject has simultaneously destroyed the very con­
dition of the possibility of self-certainty. The struggle thus ends unsatisfactorily 
111 In this passage and in the entire paragraph that follows, which is dedicated to the fai lure of the 
�tru •glc, l legcl neither u e the ubjunctive n r the per pcctive of the philosophical observer, but 
lltthcr de cribe the experiential perspect ive of elf-con ciousncss. This is under cored by the 
01 ·nin cnt nee ofth n t I>Orll ruph: "In I hi . p rlcnc ·, elf-consciousness learn that life i as 
·s� ·ntiul to it n� pur · If- on�ciou�n ·ss" (II�)  
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for the surviving self-consciousness: the certainty of self, which should have 
been gained here, is not achieved. 
The subject, who has survived the life-and-death struggle as victor, now 
draws an important conclusion from its failure. Hegel formulates this with the 
words, "In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to 
it as pure self-consciousness" ( 1 1 5). As in the other stages, the subject realizes 
that it can only achieve self-certainty if it develops a different form of self­
conception. The new conception that it reaches now consists in the insight that 
it can only be certain of itself if both its own life and the life of the other are 
preserved. The surviving subject thus realizes that it must protect life if it 
wishes to actualize itself as self-consciousness. This insight represents the de­
cisive turning point for the further course of the story: its consequence is that 
the subject at the next encounter with another human no longer seeks conflict 
but rather a different resolution. This resolution will consist, as Hegels teaches 
us, in the confirmation of the superior freedom of the other and the acknowl­
edgement of him as his lord. The reason for this 'self-chosen bondage' is that 
the subject can expect from this subjugation a reliable self-conception in his 
life.21 That is because to the extent that the bondsman confirms the lord, he 
can assume that the lord will acknowledge him. The subject, whose process of 
experience we are following, thereby exchanges its initial self-conception of 
superior freedom (which it realises cannot be actualized) for a self-conception 
of inferior freedom, because it can at least reach certainty about this. The 
bondsman is thus ready to subjugate himself, because in exchange he receives 
at least as much recognition as he requires to reach a minimal form of self­
certainty. 
In the reading proposed here, the bondsman embodies the figure that shows 
us how existential the desire for self-certainty can be. He realizes that before 
being incapable of reaching any self-certainty at all, he will rather accept a 
form of disrespectful recognition to reach with its help at least some form of 
self-certainty. What Hegel is thus presenting with the figure of the bondsman, 
one could say, is an 'ontological primacy' of the desire for recognition over the 
desire to actualize a specific conception of self. As opposed to the heroic 
reading, which emphasizes the sovereignty of the lord, for the subaltern reading 
the heteronomy of the bondsman is crucial. It starts from the premise that in­
stead of seeing the transition from the struggle for recognition to the relation­
ship of lordship and bondage as motivated by a heroic form of independence, 
we should rather pay attention to the far-reaching mode of dependency that 
Hegel shows us in the figure of the bondsman. This dependency can, in certain 
2 1  Paul Redding has pointed out that the bondsman declares himself ready to take on his subjuga­
tion precisely in exchange for a form of self-certainty: "But it is important that the bondsman's role 
has been chosen, rather than simply accepted as 'given.' . . .  The bondsman has, we might say, com­
milled himself to his identity in exchange for hi life and he holds 11/ms •{(In hi� COII1milment in hi 
continuul ucknowlcd crncnt of the other as his lord b treat in hint lr� w •h" (I ·tltlln 009, I 06). 
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circumstances, go so far as to make the subject accept relations of inequality. 
Insofar, namely, as the subject accepts its role in such asymmetric relations, it 
is assured of at least some form of recognition. 
A serious objection that can be raised against my reading of the lord/bondsman­
relationship is that such a relation of recognition is necessarily condemned to 
failure. Hegel himself points out in a central passage that the bondsman's rec­
ognition is worthless for the lord, because the lord cannot regard him as an 
equal. Relations of recognition, it can be argued, contain an emancipatory po­
tential because those privileged in these relations only gain satisfaction to the 
extent that a mutual symmetrical equality between the actors has been estab­
lished.22 This objection seems to me to be justified insofar as it points out that 
relations of recognition matter the more they are actualized in mutual sym­
metric relations. At the same time however, it seems to me that this objection 
does not hold insofar as it is based on the assumption that unequal relations 
of recognition are necessarily unsatisfying for those privileged in these rela­
tions. One can argue against this assumption on three grounds: first, the dis­
tinction introduced earlier between egalitarian and differential recognition 
hows that an asymmetrical relation of worth can be based on a symmetrical 
relation of respect. Put more simply, even if the lord despises the bondsman 
in his concrete conditions of life, he can nevertheless enjoy the respect of the 
bondsman as long as he regards him as in his essence fundamentally equal to 
him. Second, this would mean that the lord could gain sufficient recognition 
through increasing his followers. In this model the lord would reach a satis­
factory amount of recognition by multiplying the slight recognition of the 
bondsman by means of the number of his followers. And third, the recognition 
that the lord seeks can also come from a third party. Because he has a bonds­
man, the lord can be recognized by another lord. Kojeve has in mind such a 
re olution of the dual problem of recognition through the involvement of a 
third party when he writes: "Actually, others recognize the master as master 
nly because he has a slave" (Kojeve 1 980, 20). 
11 Avishai Margal it describes the failure of the lord quite vividly with the following comparison: 
"The master's attitude here is similar to that of a soccer team that wants to defeat the rival side 
d ·cisivcly but also wants its victory to be recognized as an achievement. A crushing victory de­
., •u ·cs the value of winning ince it tc t i fic that the other side was not a worthy opponent. Here 
I I · the contradicti n one want and d not nwunl to trounce one's rival , at one and the same 
t irn . . . l lumilintion is intended bolh 10 prov • ob ·olutc upcriority and to win rcco nition, which 
I COI1'!lptunl impo ihil lt " ( Mor Olit II)<)(), I () f )  
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III. Symbolic Vulnerability and Disrespect 
In the previous section I argued that with the lord/bondsman-relationship Hegel 
shows us an asymmetrical relation of recognition. I suggested that the bonds­
man accepts the disrespect towards him because he realizes how existential 
the recognition by another is for him. After this re-reading of Hegel's text, I 
would now like to bring to light the outcome contained in this reading. First, I 
will explain how the struggle for recognition should be read as an occurrence 
of disrespect. In a second step, I will explain wherein the specific form of 
symbolic vulnerability provoked by this struggle consists. On this basis, I 
would like to make clear in a final step which conditions motivate the bonds­
man to subjugate himself and identity with the bonds that tie him to this sub­
jugation. 
(i) Let us begin by recalling what happens in the struggle for recognition. In 
the vocabulary that resulted from this encounter we can say that the struggle 
begins with the meeting of two 'lords.' In their self-conceptions these two lords 
see themselves as beings that possess an unrestricted freedom. Their self-con­
ceptions are constituted along the axis of superiority and inferiority, upon 
which each assumes to hold a higher position than the other, insofar as each 
expects the other to subjugate himself to his claim to unrestricted freedom. In 
the self-conception of the actors there is already a latent tendency of disrespect 
towards the other. This is expressed in the moment that the two subjects com­
municate: since by mutually expressing the self-conception of their own supe­
riority, they articulate not simply a neutral evaluation of the situation, but each 
rather expresses disrespect for the other. Again, in the vocabulary developed 
from the outcome of the struggle we could say that each of the two lords ex­
presses that he holds the other for a mere bondsman. The expression, ''you're 
nothing but a bondsman!", is understood by each participant as an instance of 
disrespect, because it is not compatible with its particular self-conception. If 
we reformulate what happens in the struggle for recognition in this way, then 
the struggle must be understood at least as an occurrence of mutual disrespect, 
in the sense that the participants fight with the means of symbolic violence 
before the struggle escalates to physical violence. 
While it seems obvious how physical violence may result in injury, it is 
not at all clear how symbolic violence may cause harm. While in everyday life 
one speaks of how an act of disrespect 'hurts,' and we are used to using the 
concept of injury to describe damage to the material existence of the body, 
what the concept in this symbolic context might mean has yet to be clarified. In 
this regard, I think Hegel's theory of self-consciousness provides us with the 
corresponding vocabulary: his thoughts on the theory of recognition allow us 
to reformulate the vulnerability called forth through an act f di re pect in the 
nt ·t f a  the ry of the ubjcct. 
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(ii) What the subject's symbolic vulnerability consists in becomes clear when 
one looks at the theory of recognition from its other side. For indeed, what 
Hegel presents from one side as the process of subjectivation is, when looked 
at from the other side, in fact nothing other than a process of de-subjectivation. 
Thus, an act of disrespect can be described as harming the process in which the 
subject gains self-certainty. A central step in this process, as we have seen with 
the transition from practical to social self-consciousness, is the social existence 
of the subject. But as this existence only lasts as long as it is continually re­
produced through recognition by others, disrespect can be understood as a 
threatening to dissolve the subject's social existence by means of a refusal to 
recognize. However, insofar as the self-relation of the subject is first actualized 
in social existence, how that social existence may be harmed must be under­
stood in a second step as a process in which the self-relation of the subject is 
at stake. On this second level, harm would no longer represent dissolution but 
rather a disruption that makes it impossible to build a secure self-relation. 
Moreover, because the subject's self-relation is harmed by disrespect, in a third 
step we have before us a form of violence towards the subject's very self-con­
ception. And on this third level, harm would thus mean that the subject comes 
to doubt whether that which it held to be its truth is really right. It is thereby 
set back into the state of lacking self-certainty which was to ignite its desire for 
self-certainty at the very beginning of the story of the experience of self-con­
sciousness. In contrast to the previous state however, the subject meanwhile 
knows that it is not alone in the world and that it cannot realise itself as a so­
litary 'I'. For the subject, this relapse into a state of lack is thus connected to 
the experience of a painful loss, as it falls out of the world in which it had al­
ready found a place. In the vocabulary that we have developed with the help 
of Hegel's theory of recognition, we are now in a position to reformulate sym­
bolic harm in three distinct ways: as dissolution of the social existence of the 
subject, as disruption of its self-relation, and as doubt about its own self-con­
ception. 
The extent to which doubt about one's own self-conception can become an 
existential danger can be measured by a Hegelian reading of Rene Descartes' 
M��itations .on First Philosophy. Descartes famously begins this project by r�1smg a rad.1cal doubt, suspending all opinions that seem even slightly ques­t ionable. Th1s process goes so far that Descartes even questions his own exis­
tence. Like Hegel's Phenomenology, the Meditations are at first set out as a 
project to find self-certainty, but unlike the Phenomenology, the question is 
not "Who am I?" but instead the existential question, "Do I exist at all?''. Now 
we know that the point at which Descartes' doubt turns into certainty is the 
·ccmingly irreducible cogito ergo sum. With this proposition Descartes thinks 
h ha found the Archimedcan point from which his own existence as well as 
that f the urr unding w rid an b pr vcn. But we at o know that at thi 
point I ' art . ha. nly prov •n th ' •xist  'n f hi r •s cogitcms. This cr-
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tainty is not sufficient to also gain certainty of himself as res extensa. To do 
this, he introduces the idea of God in a second step. It is God that ensures the 
subject that it has a physical manifestation through which it finds itself in the 
world. The certainty of his own physical existence that Descartes seeks is thus 
in the end not secured by his own ' 1, '  but is dependent, rather, upon that sin­
gular and absolute other that he calls God. Now if at this point we make a jump 
from Descartes' argument to Hegel's, it becomes clear that Hegel lets the secu­
lar other take the place that Descartes attributed to the absolute other. By 
means of his recognition, the secular other secures the existence of the sub­
ject in the world. And when this recognition is lacking, the subject is thrown 
back to the sole truth of his cogito. It knows of its own existence, but it cannot 
be sure whether it also exists in the world. Thus, the lack of recognition is ex­
perienced by the subject as a threatening loss of its worldly self-certainty. So 
from Hegel's perspective, the Cartesian subject can ultimately only overcome 
its doubt regarding its own existence, by knowing itself to be recognized by an 
other. Otherwise it finds itself in the precarious state that Descartes, at the 
beginning of his first meditation, describes as a waking dream. In this state 
the subject doubts whether it exists in the world surrounding it or whether it 
is in a state of invisibility, wandering around as a bodiless manifestation. 
It is precisely this state of invisibility that is often used in contemporary 
social philosophical discourse to describe exclusion from social processes of 
recognition. Many people experience the refusal of recognition as a threat to 
their visibility in the surrounding lifeworld.23 Returning to our first question 
as to what constitutes the specific quality of hurt or harm caused by disrespect, 
we are now in a position to propose the following answer: while physical vio­
lence aims to inflict bodily harm, symbolic violence aims to bring about the 
disappearance of subjectivity. When we understand the life-and-death struggle 
as an occurrence of disrespect, what is therefore at stake is not primarily the 
physical life of the protagonists, but rather the subject's "being in the world." 
What Hegel thus wishes to show us with the transition from the struggle to 
the relation of lord and bondsman is that the emergence of this relation results 
from the fear of losing this being in the world. The "absolute lord,'' before 
whom the subservient consciousness trembles, represents in my reading not so 
much the fear of physical death as the fear of social death. Insofar as the bonds­
man has experienced this social death when through the killing of the other 
he was left without recognition, he was already confronted with the state that 
Hegel described fittingly with the words: "In that experience it undergoes an 
internal dissolution, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything 
23 This point has been taken up most recently by Honneth 200 1 .  Using the example of Ralph 
Ellison's 1952 novel The Invisible Man, Honneth makes it  clear that gestures of provocation some­
time aid tho e who are socially excluded to achieve at least some form of visibility. Even if such 
pr vocations arc mostly answered with disrespecting sanctions, they arc t i l l  important for those 
c nc rncd, h cou c thr u h them o minimol de rec or visibilit con b · u ·hi ·v •d 
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solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations" (1 I 7, translation modi­
fied). The experience of the dissolution of one's own existence that Hegel 
presents here is nothing else than the transition to an experience of social in­
visibility, which results from the loss of any and all forms of self-certainty. 
(iii) The threat of social death forms the starting point from which, in a final 
step, I would like to describe the social dynamic of disrespect in the lord/bonds­
man-relationship. Following this dynamic it can be made plausible why the 
bondsman binds himself step by step further to the disrespect of the lord up 
until the point of complete identification. This process has three stages, which 
we can call acceptance, admission, and acquisition. Let us first consider ac­
ceptance: the reason why a subject sometimes accepts disrespect is that before 
it risks dying a social death, it will rather accept that minimal form of recog­
nition still present in an insult. Even potentially harmful words like "you're 
nothing but a bondsman!" still contain a minimal degree of recognition, be­
cause even an utterance that asserts its addressee is no-one is still addressed to 
someone, who is told that he is no-one. This "paradox of humiliation" is based 
upon the fact that even those speech acts that claim to deny the humanity of the 
addressee are directed towards a human being and thus appellatively confirm 
the very thing they semantically deny.24 Even if disrespect does not allow one 
to maintain one's own individual conception of self, it does at least allow a sub­
ject to hold on to the elementary form of self-conception that consists in the 
fact of being a human being. This form of confirmation entails that we should 
not understand recognition and disrespect as polar opposites, but rather con­
ceive them as two sides of one and the same process. rt is not the case that dis­
respect begins where recognition ends, but that recognition forms the condition 
of the possibility of disrespect. The reason why we sometimes accept harmful 
words is thus simply that these are acts of disrespectful recognition, and as such 
have the power to save us from social death in that they concede us at least 
orne form of existence in the world. 
The second level of the dynamic in the lord/bondsman-relationship can be 
described as a process of admission. This starts from the premise that most 
cases of disrespect not only provide an elementary form of recognition, but 
lhat beyond they also contain an attribution. In our case this means that the 
in ult "you are nothing but a bondsman!"  not only disputes the self-conception 
f the addressee, but at the same time attributes the addressee a new form of 
. elf-conception for which it offers appreciation. To the degree that the insult 
denies the subject recognition of its already existing conception of self, it opens 
1 new horizon in which the subject could achieve self-certainty. The decisive 
11 A vi hai Margalit fl nnulate the 'paradox or humiliation' with reference to the lordlbondsman­
r•lntion hip a follows: "humilnt ion typicnll pre. upp c the humanity of the humilated. l lumi­
linting bchoviour rejects the oth r nq 110nhunmn, hut th a t of rejection pre uppo c that it i a 
person thot is b ·in • r � ctcd" ( Mn• alit I 9 )6, I 09) 
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element in this process is that the new self-conception offered is for the most 
part one that is considered socially inferior so that the subject concerned cannot 
find itself again in it. This is because an act of disrespect is always connected 
to a social displacement, in which a 'higher' conception of self is exchanged 
for an ' inferior' one. This knowledge can be traced in the everyday expressions 
we use to describe such scenarios. With dynamic concepts such as degradation, 
disparagement, or depreciation, we express precisely that the new self-con­
ception on offer has less social value. And insofar as a subject is forced to take 
on this new self-conception, it must objectifY itself in a social existence that it 
is actually not willing to take over.25 In this case, disrespect can be described as 
misrecognition of the former social existence of the subject. This entails that 
the subject is confined in an alien self-conception. The admission of an act of 
disrespect thus goes along with an alienation in the subject's self-conception. 
And insofar as the subject is thereby forced to develop itself toward a self-con­
ception in which it cannot find itself, we can also speak of a reification. If the 
harm caused by the act of disrespect can be described on the one hand as dis­
solution, disturbance, and doubt, we see here how these moments are trans­
formed into misrecognition, alienation, and reification. 
The moment of acquisition forms the third and final stage in the dynamic of 
lord and bondsman. It consists in the gradual closure of the gap between the 
subject's own self-conception and the self-conception forced upon it from out­
side. Insofar as the subject cannot rely on alternative contexts of recognition 
that support its self-conception, it begins to identifY gradually ever more with 
the self-conception ascribed to it in the act of disrespect. This identification 
entails that the bondsman acquires step by step the concepts that are at the same 
time the means of his subjugation. His desire for self-certainty turns into the 
desire for his own submission. This nexus in the desire of the subject leads to 
a situation in which the more it strives towards recognition, the more firmly it 
is chained to its submission. The subject will thereby identifY ever more with 
the act of disrespect "you are nothing but a bondsman!". The submission, in 
this case, becomes part of the process of subjectivation, so that the inferiority 
is accepted and the lord's contempt toward it internalized to the point of self­
contempt.26 It is not seldom that this form of acquisition results in paralysing 
self-hate, which not only leads the subordinated subject to continually charac­
terise itself with pejorative expressions ("I am nothing but a lowly bondsman") 
25 Using a reconstruction of John Austin's theory of speech acts, Judith Butler has explored the 
social conditions that could make such a takeover necessary (Butler 1 997). 
26 Charles Taylor describes this process as follows: "Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict 
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode 
of being" (Taylor 1 992, 25). And as regards African Americans, he cites in agreement: "An ana­
logous point has been made in relation to blacks: that white society has for generations projected 
a demeaning image of them, which some of them have been unable to resist adopting. Their own 
elf-depreciation, on this view, becomes one of the mo t potent instruments of their own oppres­
sion" ( ibid., 26). 
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but also prevents it from defYing the disrespect shown toward it. Through de­
fiance it would revolt against the very framework of recognition that secures 
the certainty of its own existence. On the basis of this moment of acquisition 
we can thus understand the stability of the relationship of lord and bondsman to 
the effect that overcoming this relationship would require questioning exactly 
those �onditions that bring the subject into being in the first place. Hegel's pre­
sentation of the story of the development of self-consciousness in the Phenome­
nology, which in the classical reading is interpreted as a continual progressive 
process, thus appears in a different light. Here one sees clearly the extent to 
which the dependency on recognition can set in motion a social dynamic of dis­
respect that leaves the subject with - to conclude with a word from Adorno -
a 'damaged life.' 
Translated by Anita Mage and Alice Lagaay 
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Foreword & Acknowledgements 
What do G.W. Hegel's dialectics of recognition, Luk Perceval's theatrical stag­
ing of Penthesilea, a French politician's hunger strike and Richard Serra's 
sculptures for urban space all have in common? They can be described as 
pertaining to various interconnected modes of destructive dynamics within a 
performative paradigm. Performativity is conceived here as a multi-faceted 
concept used to grasp and connect phenomena from different contexts on a 
spectrum ranging from language and social theory to drama and theatrical 
practice, from aesthetics and cultural science to economics and process theory. 
In all these realms, what characterises the performative perspective is a sharp­
ened focus on the material and sensual, i.e. aisthetical character of events, 
and on the reality-constituting power of human actions and processes. Theore­
tical approaches informed by performative theories do not take for granted, in 
an essentialist sense, what lies before and around us as the world, but strive to 
draw attention to the particular manner in which that world is constituted in its 
very multi-dimensionality by human activities, processes, events and, above 
all perhaps, by perspectives. In recent years, the performative paradigm has 
had a profound influence on theory in the humanities and has led, broadly 
speaking, to a heightened understanding of the general interrelatedness of hu­
man realities. This emphasis has resulted, however, in something of a bias to­
wards, on the one hand, positive phenomena and positively connotated meta­
phors to describe those phenomena, such as "action," "productivity" and "pres­
ence," "voice," "embodied language," "actualisation," "event-ness" and "mate­
riality." On the other hand, the focus on the creation and interrelation of human 
realities has tended to overlook the often simultaneous destructivity involved 
in those processes. 
In response to this bias, there have been increasing moves in recent years to 
investigate the boundaries of the seemingly activist and generativist perfor­
mative tendency. This is a drive to uncover, as it were, the "tlipside" of per­
formativity by addressing not just the positive phenomena of human action, 
production, language and presence, but also the negative counterparts of these, 
as in for example "inoperativity," "restraint," "absence" and "silence." More­
over, first steps have been taken to investigate both the productive effective­
ness of these various modes of action and phenomena, and the destructive 
dimension involved in all. 
This volume is the result of a three-year interdisciplinary research focus 
group (2008-20 I 0) dedicated to "Destructive Dynamics and Performativity" 
within the Collaborative Research Centre "Performing Cultures" (Sonderfor­
schungsbereich 'Kulturen des Performativen ') at the Freie Universittit Berlin. 
• 
6 Foreword & Acknowledgements 
The particularity of this volume is that it does not simply present a selection 
of papers that have been commissioned by the editors on a particular theme, 
but that it presents the results of a group of researchers who, from various 
disciplinary backgrounds, met together to discuss and collaborate on the theme 
of destructivity. The individual articles in this volume are thus shaped and 
informed by the many discussions we held. We are grateful to all the mem­
bers of the focus group "Destructive Dynamics and Performativity" for the 
lively and inspiring debates held there: to Hartmut Bohme, Leena Crasemann, 
Robert Felfe, and Barbara Gronau; to Kristiane Hasselmann, Steffen K. Herr­
mann, Elke Koch, Hannes Kuch, Renate Lorenz and Robert Schmidt; to Jenny 
Schrodt, Sabine Schi.ilting, Andrea Sieber and Kirsten Wagner; to Rebecca 
Wolf, Volker Woltersdorff, and Ulrike Zellmann. We also extend our thanks 
to the guest speakers who inspired and contributed to our discussions: Rein­
hold Gorling, Vinzenz Hediger, Linda Hentschel, Jose E. Munoz and Joseph 
Yogi, as well as to Nikita Dhawan and Katja Rothe for kindly accepting the in­
vitation to contribute to this volume. Our heartfelt thanks go to Erika Fischer­
Lichte, chairwoman of the Collaborative Research Centre, for encouraging 
and supporting this research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the valuable work of the team of competent and 
dedicated translators, Anita Mage, Laura Radosh, Gratia Stryker-Harte!, and 
Kate Sturge, as well as Christian Struck's part in preparing the manuscript. 
Finally, we are most grateful to Esther Roth and the editorial board at Rodopi 
for their helpful comments and the enthusiasm they have brought to this 
project. It has been a pleasure preparing this volume with them. 
Alice Lagaay & Michael Lorber 
Berlin, July 2011 
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Introduction: 
Destruction in the Performative 
Alice Lagaay and Michael Lorber 
Cultural transformation tends to be described in one of two ways: either with 
reference to what comes about, is created or emerges in the process of change, 
or with reference to what is destroyed or obscured in that process. Within a 
performative paradigm, that is, from a perspective that focuses on the manner 
in which social and cultural reality is constituted or brought about by human 
activity, theorists have tended to underline the productive aspects of transfor­
mation by emphasising the creative thrust of performative processes and 
events. In so doing, this perspective has tended to overlook the extent to which 
a certain destructive element may in fact be inherent to such performative pro­
cesses. 
Within the realm of cultural studies, there have been recent calls for, and 
some preliminary steps taken towards contouring, a new "theory of destruc­
tion" to meet- and to some extent to counter- what have been broadly identi­
fied as the dominant discourses of innovation, creativity and emergence (e.g. 
Alan Liu, 2009). The present volume answers that call, albeit within a particu­
lar context of its own. It seeks to explore the manner in which destructivity 
such as the destabilisation and destruction of orders, subjects and bodies can be 
grasped by concepts of performativity. In other words, to what extent may a 
certain destructive dynamic be inscribed within the very notion of performati­
vity? 
Performativity, as understood here, is rooted in a variety of theoretical 
perspectives combining linguistic, cultural-sociological as well as aesthetic 
concerns, all of which are of relevance for a multitude of different disciplines. 
Firstly, the concept refers back to John L. Austin's speech act theory and his 
analysis of the manner in which language can be shown to be not just simply a 
medium of human expression, not just used, that is, to describe an event or a 
reality that is external to it, but that its very utterance can bring about a trans­
formation of reality (cf. Austin 1 962; Searle 1 969). Secondly, the concept re­
lates to Judith Butler's notion of the performative constitution of (gender) 
ubjectivity by means of ritualised linguistic iteration and culturally pre­
cribed patterns of behaviour (e.g. Butler 1 993). Furthermore, the concept in­
c rp rate a more general reference, drawn from a theatrical and anthropologi­
cal c ntcxt, t the embodied practice and ocially encoded ritualised event 
